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I. INTRODUCTION 
The judiciary and Congress have long grappled with the proper 
interpretation of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. They have 
also struggled to interpret and redraft copyright laws to keep up with a 
world where the mediums of creative expression are ever evolving. 
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Riding on the crest of this perpetual conundrum is the management of the 
idea-expression divide that exists at the heart of every copyright 
protection analysis. Underpinning the idea-expression divide lay the 
doctrines of merger and scènes à faire (“the doctrines”): both simple in 
theory yet elusive in practice. The merger doctrine states that where an 
idea is inseparably connected to a particular expression, the idea and the 
expression are said to have “merged” with one another.1 Such connection 
between idea and expression is not protected under copyright law, 
because it would contravene the notion of original expression protection 
by unfairly granting a monopoly to the author and banning all others 
from expressing the idea.2 Similarly, the scènes à faire doctrine bars 
standard phrases that necessarily flow from a common setting or theme 
from copyright protection.3 
As a testimony to the cumbersome nature of copyright analysis, a 
circuit split has perpetuated for decades regarding proper application of 
the two doctrines in the copyright infringement context. In a copyright 
infringement case, the plaintiff must prove two things: (1) the existence 
of a valid copyright and (2) that the defendant actually copied the work.4 
When merger and scènes à faire are introduced, the courts have 
inconsistently applied the doctrines in their analyses. With regard to the 
merger doctrine, it has been held by the Second and Ninth Circuits, on 
the one hand, that the merger doctrine should only operate as a defense to 
copyright infringement.5 On the other hand, it has been held by the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits that merger determines copyrightability.6 A 
similar rift exists regarding the application of the scènes à faire doctrine. 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have taken the stance that scènes à faire 
is separate from the doctrine regarding the validity of copyright7 while 
the Second and Sixth Circuits have applied scènes à faire to a 
determination of copyrightability.8 
                                                                                                             
 1 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.03[B][3][b] (Matthew Bender & Co. 2006). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. § 13.03[B][4]. 
 4 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534-36 (6th 
Cir. 2004). 
 5 Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); Kregos v. 
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 6 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 535; Mason v. Montgomery Data, 967 F.2d 135, 138 (5th 
Cir. 1992); see Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475-76 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
 7 Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082; Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 
914 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 8 Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2004); Hoehling v. 
Universal Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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Although it has been asserted that no difference in outcome arises 
from either approach,9 the enactment of the groundbreaking Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) and recent case law demand a 
new look at the consequences of the two approaches. The DMCA grants 
additional legal protection to owners of copyrights who utilize 
technology as a means to safeguard their works in digital form10 by 
proscribing the anticircumvention of such protection measures.11 
Potential liability is triggered for even an attempt at accessing a 
copyrighted work that sits behind a technological protection measure, 
whether successful or not. This right to access, or “paracopyright,” as it 
is commonly known, has been the source of much controversy among 
legal theorists and practitioners as it has greatly expanded the rights 
bestowed upon a copyright owner.12 
This comment attempts to provide a circumspect analysis of the 
merger and scènes à faire doctrines as well as their application to the 
modern digital world. It further attempts to show that, in light of the 
harsh liability under the DMCA that is triggered by the circumvention of 
technological protection measures, courts should be more reluctant to 
permit copyright in marginal cases. Pre-DMCA case law demonstrates 
that a majority of circuits follow this approach. Those circuits consider 
this approach to support the constitutional goal of fostering creative 
expression. A second rationale is that this approach supports the policy 
of § 102(b) to protect ideas from ownership so as to avoid unfair 
monopolies. Finally, this comment shows that failure to apply the 
doctrines as bars to copyrightability will yield false positives, the effect 
of which stands in direct contrast to the constitutional goal of fostering 
creative expression. In light of these arguments, the courts must employ 
greater prudence when they consider which approach to take. This 
comment does not assert that the doctrines should be removed from the 
affirmative defense prong of an infringement suit entirely, but rather that 
the doctrines should be applied first at the copyrightability stage, 
particularly in future DMCA cases. 
                                                                                                             
 9 See Scott Abrahamson, Comment, Seen One, Seen Them All? Making Sense of the 
Copyright Merger Doctrine, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1164 (1998). In either case, the 
Abrahamson comment notes that the practical outcome  remains the same. It is 
respectfully noted that this law review article was published the same year that the 
DMCA was enacted. It would have been impossible for the author to consider the 
implications created by the DMCA. 
 10 JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 573, 578 
(Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., Asben Law & Bus. 2002). 
 11 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 12 For example, see Copyfight, http://copyfight.corante.com, which lists copious 
articles written by legal practitioners and other highly respected thinkers on the 
consequences of the DMCA and other copyright issues. 
306 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:303 
II. THE IDEA-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY AND THE MERGER AND SCÈNES À 
FAIRE DOCTRINES 
To fully understand the arguments proposed in this comment, it is 
critical to first develop the idea-expression dichotomy and the related 
doctrines of merger and scènes à faire. This section provides that 
foundation by setting forth several core policies underlying copyright 
law. The section then discusses how the courts have struggled to evaluate 
ideas and expressions in an attempt to support these policies and, in 
doing so, have utilized the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire as a 
tool to aid them in their analyses. 
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”13 While the Framers of the Constitution left much 
unclear by this statement, it suggests a goal to enhance public welfare by 
promoting the creation and dissemination of knowledge.14 The copyright, 
which secures for a limited time an ownership right over a creative work, 
serves as an economic incentive in furtherance of this goal.15 In direct 
opposition to the constitutional goal of copyright law, the dissemination 
of knowledge would be compromised if an author were allowed to have a 
monopoly over an idea.16 It is a long-standing principle that copyright 
protection extends to the expression and not to the idea. This principle 
stems from the notion that “ideas are free to the world”17 and that the 
protection of an idea would create an unfair monopoly on the part of the 
owner of the copyrighted work. Congress codified this notion in § 102(b) 
of the 1976 Copyright Act, which states that “in no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”18 This tenet of copyright law 
begets the very dilemma with which courts grapple in copyright 
                                                                                                             
 13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14 CRAIG JOYCE, ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 19 (6th ed. 2003). 
 15 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
 16 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) 
(“[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original  expression, but encourages others 
to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work. It is the means by 
which copyright advances the progress of science and art.” (citation omitted)). 
 17 Taylor v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 115 F. Supp. 156, 157 (S.D. Cal. 1953). 
 18 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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infringement cases: how to properly separate the idea and the 
expression.19 
Separating idea from expression has long troubled the courts. In 
1930, Judge Learned Hand summarily explained the impossibility of a 
universally generalizable solution: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of 
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and 
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more 
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at 
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this 
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since 
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to 
which, apart from their expression, his property is never 
extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and 
nobody ever can.20 
The well-known doctrines of merger and scènes à faire emerged from 
the difficulty in managing the idea-expression dichotomy. 
The merger doctrine states that, where an idea is inseparably 
connected to a particular expression, the idea and the expression are said 
to have “merged” with one another.21 This unity of idea and expression 
arises when there is only one or very few ways of expressing the idea.22 
Such connection between idea and expression would contravene the 
notion of original expression protection and unfairly grant a monopoly to 
the author banning others from expressing the idea.23 For example, one 
can express a map with directions to a buried treasure in very few ways. 
To prevent unfair copyright protection in these cases, the courts have 
implemented the merger doctrine to protect free expression to all above 
granting an express monopoly over a single idea.24 
Although the merger doctrine was historically applied to cases 
involving literature, maps, compilations, and the like, the invention of the 
computer and the incorporation of computer software into copyrightable 
subject matter added a new dimension to merger applications. With 
                                                                                                             
 19 This issue also relates to unfair monopolies. See Abrahamson, supra note 9 at 1125 
(“Too much copyright protection may bestow a windfall upon the party alleging 
infringement . . . and may exert a dampening effect on future efforts; yet too little 
protection, or none at all, may deprive the creator of the reward incentive which would in 
turn chill future creative efforts and perhaps result in market failure.”). 
 20 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citation 
omitted). 
 21 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[B][3][b]. 
 22 E.g., Hart v. Dan Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 23 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[B][3][b]. 
 24 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[B][3]. 
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regard to computer software, the individual elements of the computer 
program may be considered to have merged with the idea.25  
Several important cases have developed this concept. In 1984, the 
court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. examined the 
merger doctrine.26 The court noted that if the computer program at issue 
can be written in other fashions and perform the same function then the 
program is a copyrightable expression of an idea.27 The court stated that 
“this inquiry is no different than that made to determine whether the 
expression and idea have merged, which has been stated to occur where 
there are no or few other ways of expressing a particular idea.”28 If the 
idea merges with the expression, a copyright is unavailable.29 A more 
sophisticated application of the doctrine was explored in Atari Games 
Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc.,30 which held that “if the patentable 
process is embodied inextricably in the line-by-line instructions of the 
computer program . . . then the process merges with the expression and 
precludes copyright protection.”31 In Brown Bag Software v. Symantec 
Corp., the Ninth Circuit used a “functional demands” approach and held 
that the portions of the computer program “essential to the idea of the 
computer program were ideas and unprotected.”32 In Gates Rubber Co. v. 
Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., another court defined merger as 
“expression that is inseparable from or merged with the ideas, processes, 
                                                                                                             
 25 Id.; see Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839-40 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992); see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 
542 (6th Cir. 2004) (“What is clear is that the bytes containing the ‘LXK’ reference are 
functional in the sense that they, like the rest of the Toner Loading Program, also serve as 
input to the checksum operation and as a result amount to a lock-out code that the merger 
and scènes à faire doctrines preclude from obtaining protection.”). 
 26 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). In this case, Apple challenged a denial of a motion 
for preliminary injunction against Franklin Computer Corp. for copyright infringement of 
fourteen of Apple’s computer programs including its operating system (other claims not 
pertinent to this comment were also before the court). Id. at 1242. In the district court, 
Franklin disputed the claim under the defense that Apple’s programs were not 
copyrightable subject matter. Id. at 1244. 
 27 Id. at 1252. 
 28 Id. at 1253 (citing Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st 
Cir. 1967); Freedman v. Grolier Enters., Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) 
(“Copyright protection will not be given to a form of expression necessarily dictated by 
the underlying subject matter.”). 
 29 Apple, 714 F.2d at 1253. 
 30 975 F.2d 832, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 31 Id. 
 32 960 F.2d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992). In this case, Brown Bag Software sued 
Symantec for copyright infringement of Brown Bag’s computer program, which was 
protected under a registered copyright. Id. at 1468. The district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of Symantec and Brown Bag appealed. Id. 
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or discoveries underlying the expression.”33 The court noted that, in 
applying merger and other limiting doctrines, the source code and object 
code will constitute copyright-protected material in most cases whereas 
the main purpose of a program never will.34 
The doctrine of scènes à faire also limits copyright protection. 
Literally, it translates to “‘scenes’ . . . ‘that must be done.’”35 In the 
literary context, it bars phrases that are “standard, stock, . . . or that 
necessarily follow from a common theme or setting” from copyright 
protection.36 A classic example of a stock scene is the inclusion of a 
criminal foot chase in a police fiction or the use of a tough-speaking 
Italian mobster smoking a cigar in a Mafia movie.37 In Hoehling v. 
Universal Studios, a case which considered the copyrightability of a 
book on the voyages of the famed Hindenburg ship, the Second Circuit 
declared that “[b]ecause it is virtually impossible to write about a 
particular historical era or fictional theme without employing certain 
‘stock’ or standard literary devices . . . scenes à faire are not 
copyrightable as a matter of law.”38 Although scènes à faire would 
appear at first glance to be limited to cases involving movies, plays, and 
other artistic media, it extends to the computer software context as well. 
Scènes à faire is applied to the elements of a computer program that 
are dictated by the requirements of the system as a whole such as 
“hardware standards and mechanical specifications, software standards 
and compatibility requirements, computer manufacturer design 
standards, target industry practices and demands, and computer industry 
programming practices.”39 A major goal of computer software and 
systems, in general, is efficiency. From a utilitarian perspective, the more 
efficient a program is, the less memory it will require from a computer 
and, therefore, the more marketable it will be. A second major goal of 
computer software is interoperability. Interoperability is a computer 
program’s ability to function properly with other software or even 
hardware components. For instance, a computer’s operating system, 
                                                                                                             
 33 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993). In this case, Bando Chemical hired away 
numerous Gates employees to help create a computer program, similar to one created by 
Gates, that performed complex calculations for rubber belt manufacturing. Id. at 830-31. 
Gates sued Bando for copyright infringement and the lower court entered a decision 
against them. Id. at 830. Bando appealed the decision as well as other claims not pertinent 
to this comment. Id. 
 34 Id. at 836. 
 35 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 535 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
 36 Id. (quoting Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 838). 
 37 See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 38 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 39 Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 838 (citations omitted). 
310 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:303 
whether Microsoft XP or Mac OS, must be able to operate with the 
various software applications it calls upon, whether Microsoft-made or 
not, as well as the various hardware components that make up the 
computer system. The drive for greater efficiency and interoperability 
severely limits the options available to computer programmers in 
expressing the function of the software. These external constraints, thus, 
figure prominently into the copyrightability of computer programs40 and 
frequently lead to a denial of copyright protection where it would 
otherwise seem warranted. 
From the foundation laid out in this section, the reader can navigate 
through the cases discussed in the next section. Those cases span decades 
of judicial decision making and cover an array of tangible mediums from 
literature to computer technology. The following section will also 
illustrate the two strains of legal thinking regarding the proper 
application of the doctrines in the copyright infringement context. 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The merger and scènes à faire doctrines are difficult to apply, 
largely due to the fact that the doctrines do not instruct courts on how to 
identify which aspects of a copyrighted work are ineligible for copyright 
protection nor what the scope of protection should be.41 The cumbersome 
nature of the doctrines naturally results in varying copyright 
infringement analyses. In a copyright infringement case, the plaintiff 
must prove two things: (1) the existence of a valid copyright and (2) that 
the defendant actually copied the work.42 With regard to the merger 
doctrine, on the one hand, some circuits hold that the merger doctrine 
should only operate as a defense to copyright infringement.43 Other 
circuits hold that merger determines copyrightability.44 A similar rift 
exists regarding the application of the scènes à faire doctrine. Some 
circuits take the stance that scènes à faire is separate from the doctrine 
                                                                                                             
 40 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 536 (citing Computer Assoc. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 
693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 41 Id.; JOYCE, supra note 14, at 166; accord Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin 
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 42 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 534-36. 
 43 Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); Kregos v. 
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 44 Lexmark, 387 F.3d 522; Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 
1992); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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regarding the validity of copyright45 while others consider scènes à faire 
to be a determination of copyrightability.46 
The following sections explain the two competing approaches to 
the application of the merger and scènes à faire doctrines in the 
copyright infringement context. These sections also support the 
application of the doctrines as bars to copyrightability. This approach 
serves the goals of § 102(b) of the Copyright Act and promotes 
competition among businesses. The judicially created tests, which 
separate idea from expression in the computer software context, also 
support the application of the doctrines as bars to copyrightability. 
Ultimately, viewing the split in relation to the groundbreaking and 
controversial Digital Millennium Copyright Act solidifies support for the 
bar to copyrightability approach in Part IV.A. 
A. The Doctrines Applied as Bars to Copyrightability 
Circuits that apply the doctrines as bars to copyrightability 
commonly find that using the merger and scènes à faire doctrines in this 
manner falls in accord with § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which 
mandates that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea . . . [or] procedure . . . regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied 
in such work.”47  The merger doctrine states that, where an idea is 
inseparably connected to a particular expression, the idea and the 
expression are said to have “merged” with one another, such that the 
expression becomes the idea and, thus, not protectable under copyright 
law.48 Similarly, scènes à faire are phrases that are “standard, stock, . . . 
or that necessarily follow from a common theme or setting;”49 they are, 
therefore, barred from copyright protection under the same principle. The 
idea/expression dichotomy is an embodiment of the constitutional goal 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”50 which, as a 
policy matter, fosters creativity within the public by protecting it from 
unfair monopolies. 
When merger is applied as a bar to copyrightability, it serves the 
constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and the 
                                                                                                             
 45 Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082; Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 
914 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 46 Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2004); Hoehling v. 
Universal Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 47 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 48 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1. 
 49 Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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useful Arts.”51 In Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress 
International, Inc.,52 the court focused, in part, on this paradigm in its 
determination that merger should be applied at the copyright stage. 
Noting that the primary goal of the Constitution was not to reward the 
author for her labor but rather to promote art and science, the Fifth 
Circuit held that copyright not only secures an author’s right in her 
creative work, but encourages others to freely build on the ideas 
expounded in those works- a principle that “‘applies to all works of 
authorship.’”53 Merger, therefore, secures that which is actually an idea 
for the public to utilize in creating other works. Quoting the Supreme 
Court, the Fifth Circuit noted that the § 102(b) “‘idea[-]expression 
dichotomy strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment 
and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while 
still protecting an author’s expression.’”54 
In Veeck, the defendant argued that the idea-expression dichotomy 
was enacted as a policy matter to “‘balance[] the competing concerns of 
providing incentive to authors to create and foster[] competition in such 
creativity.’”55 The defendant argued that merger would not bar 
copyrightability of its model building codes but rather would apply only 
if a subsequent author wishing to create a code would need to use the 
identical expression to convey the idea.56 The court reasoned that “[t]his 
argument effectively converts the merger doctrine from a limit on 
copyrightability into a mere defense against infringement based on the 
identity of the author.”57 The court held that § 102(b) fosters creativity 
not as a defense to infringement claims but rather by permitting the 
effluence of information in ideas and facts from their emergence.58 This 
goal of fostering creativity supports the rejection of merger as a defense 
against particular types of infringement, because the defense approach 
misinterprets the balance under § 102(b). 
                                                                                                             
 51 Id. 
 52 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002). In this case, Veeck published model building codes 
created by the Southern Building Code Congress International (“SBCCI”) on his website. 
Id. SBCCI’s codes were not enacted into positive law. Id. At the time of the case, the 
codes did not necessarily fall outside of copyright protection. Id. Thus, SBCCI sued 
Veeck for copyright infringement to which Veeck asserted merger as a defense. Id. 
 53 Id. at 800 (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 
(1991)). 
 54 Id. at 801 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 
556 (1985)). 
 55 Id. (quoting Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 
1463 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 801-02. 
 58 Id. at 802. 
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Due to their inherent functional nature, computer programs pose a 
bigger problem in the analysis of the idea-expression dichotomy and 
demonstrate a greater need for the application of the doctrines as bars to 
copyrightability. Although the source code and the object code of a 
computer program may warrant copyright protection, to the extent 
compatibility or efficiency requires that a specific code sequence be 
included with a component device to permit its operation, the doctrines 
generally keep the code from obtaining copyright protection.59 As the 
Ninth Circuit noted in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., “[w]hen 
specific instructions, even though previously copyrighted, are the only 
and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by 
another will not amount to infringement.”60 
This holding is consistent with the First Circuit’s decision in Lotus 
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., which involved the 
copying of a computer menu command hierarchy.61 The court did not 
concern itself with an analysis of infringement, but stated that the initial 
inquiry should be whether the menu hierarchy could be copyrighted at 
all.62  Regarding the “long prompts” (the bottom line display) component 
of the menu, the court did not take a stance on whether it was 
copyrightable, but noted that a strong argument could be made that 
merger prevented the prompts from being copyrighted.63 The court also 
discussed the menu command hierarchy as a method of operation. The 
First Circuit stated that the expressions of the menu are immaterial to a 
method of operation. While not explicitly discussing merger, the court 
stated that “[i]f specific words are essential to operating something, then 
they are part of a ‘method of operation’ and, as such, are 
unprotectable.”64 This holding supports, in the computer context, the 
barring of methods from copyright protection under § 102(b). 
Application of the doctrines as bars to copyrightability also benefits 
competition among businesses by eliminating monopoly power. In Kern 
River Gas Transmission v. Coastal Corp., the Fifth Circuit considered a 
copyright infringement case involving a topographical map upon which 
                                                                                                             
 59 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 536 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
 60 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report 20 (1979)); accord Atari Games 
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., Nos. 88-4805 & 89-0027, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6786, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 1993) (“Program code that is strictly necessary to achieve 
current compatibility presents a merger problem, almost by definition, and is thus 
excluded from the scope of any copyright.”). 
 61 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 62 Id. at 815. 
 63 Id. at 816. 
 64 Id. 
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the plaintiff, a gas transmission company, superimposed lines and mile 
markings for a natural gas pipeline development proposal.65 A competing 
company utilized these maps with certain modifications in a proposal to 
build its own pipeline.66 Plaintiff brought an action for copyright 
infringement against defendant for use of its copyrighted map.67 The 
court stated that where merger has occurred, a party is not barred from 
copying the expression, because a grant of copyright protection in that 
instance would unfairly grant a monopoly upon the idea.68 The court 
specifically agreed with the district court and stated that the proposed 
location of prospective pipelines is not copyrightable.69 If it were 
copyrightable, Kern would monopolize the idea for the location of the 
pipeline, which would foreclose competition in opposition to the 
congressional intent behind copyright law.70 The court specifically 
denied the defendant’s urging not to look at merger in terms of 
copyrightability.71 Similarly, the Third Circuit in Whelan Associates, Inc. 
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., addressed the issue of copyright 
infringement of a computer program structure.72 The court looked first at 
the copyrightability of the plaintiff’s work before considering the 
infringement analysis.73 The court also stated that scènes à faire, as a bar 
to copyrightability, is a “well-settled doctrine”; holding otherwise would 
unfairly grant a monopoly on ideas to the copyright owner.74 
Two judicially-created tests, known as the abstraction-filtration-
comparison and the extrinsic-intrinsic test, separate idea from expression 
in the computer software context and support the application of the 
doctrines as bars to copyrightability. Before merger and scènes à faire 
are applied in computer software cases, some courts must undergo the 
abstraction-filtration-comparison. In Computer Assoc. International v. 
Altai, Inc., the Second Circuit introduced the abstraction-filtration-
comparison concept to analyze copyright infringements in ascertaining 
substantial similarity.75 The abstraction test, originally expounded by 
                                                                                                             
 65 899 F.2d 1458, 1460 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 1461. 
 68 Id. at 1463 (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880)). 
 69 Id. at 1464-65. 
 70 Id. at 1463-64. 
 71 Id. at 1464. 
 72 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 73 Id. at 1224. 
 74 Id. at 1236. 
 75 982 F.2d 693, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Altai”). In this case, Computer Associates 
marketed a job scheduling program (“ADAPTER”) that was designed for IBM 
mainframes. Id. at 698. A particular component of the program acted as a translator 
between the program and the IBM operating system. Id. at 699. Altai marketed its own 
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Judge Learned Hand, requires the courts to first break down the program 
into its basic structural parts.76 Courts must effectively reverse-engineer 
the program to identify all of its abstraction levels. First, the court will 
look at the purpose of the application; then zoom in to extract the 
functions of the higher-level modules that enable the purpose of the 
application to be reached; then zoom in further to obtain the lower-level 
modules that enable the higher-level modules to work; and, ultimately, 
all that remains are the individual lines of code.77 The filtration phase 
requires the court to eliminate any abstraction level that is unprotected by 
copyright law. The court must determine if each level is an idea or 
dictated by efficiency constraints so as to be incidental to the idea; 
required by other external factors; or extracted out of the public 
domain.78 The limiting doctrines of merger and scènes à faire are then 
applied to determine whether the remaining levels of abstraction are 
protectable by copyright.79 Once all components have been sifted out 
through the filtration analysis utilizing merger and scènes à faire, then 
the substantial similarity inquiry entails determining whether any aspect 
of the plaintiff’s program was copied by the defendant.80 
This test was applied by the Eleventh Circuit in Bateman v. 
Mneumonics, Inc., which also considered the proper applications of the 
doctrines in a case concerning computer programs.81 The district court 
utilized the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to determine whether 
there was actionable similarity.82 On appeal, the court focused on the 
filtration step, which is used to separate out protectable expression from 
non-protectable expression.83 The defendants argued that both merger 
and scènes à faire should be applied at this stage in literal copying 
(word-for-word copying) analysis, whereas the court instructions stated 
                                                                                                             
job scheduler (“ZEKE” later adapted to “OSCAR”). Id. at 700. An employee of Altai 
recruited an employee of Computer Associates, who brought with him the code for 
ADAPTER. Id. He aided Altai in creating OSCAR. Id. at 700. Computer Associates sued 
Altai for copyright infringement of their ADAPTER program. Id. at 700. 
 76 Id. at 706. 
 77 Id. at 707. 
 78 Id. at 707-10. 
 79 Id. The court in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd. labeled the 
filtration step as the “process-expression” dichotomy. 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 80 Altai, 982 F.2d at 710. 
 81 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996). In this case, Bateman sued Mneumonics on several 
counts of copyright infringement of copyrighted software applications and hardware 
components. Id. at 1536. Bateman claimed that he licensed the programs to defendant but 
later terminated the license. Id. at 1538. Mneumonic, Inc. then created software that was 
interoperable with Bateman’s software. Id. at 1539. Bateman sued Mneumonics for 
copyright infringement. Id. at 1540. 
 82 Id. at 1544. 
 83 Id. 
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that filtration only played a part in non-literal copying (paraphrasing or 
copying the essence of the work) analysis.84 The court took no direct 
stance on this issue but focused on the failure of the district court to 
consider the challenges to copyrightability such as scènes à faire and 
merger.85 Undoubtedly referring to the scènes à faire doctrine, the court 
noted that programs may be dictated by external factors including 
industry demands and efficiency considerations and, if found true, should 
be applied so as to refute copyright protection of the work.86 With regard 
to the merger doctrine, the court explicitly stated that a work deemed 
copyrightable may not warrant copyright protection because this doctrine 
may render the work unoriginal.87 Accordingly, Bateman instructs that 
the doctrines must come into play to determine the copyrightability issue. 
In Brown Bag Software v. Symantec, the Ninth Circuit faced a 
copyright infringement suit regarding a computer program for 
outlining.88 The district court utilized the extrinsic-intrinsic test to 
determine the substantial similarity of the two programs.89 The extrinsic-
intrinsic test normally requires the court to perform an “analytic 
dissection” which is an objective analysis of the expressive elements of 
the work (the extrinsic test) followed by an evaluation of the substantial 
similarity in the expressions from the viewpoint of the ordinary 
reasonable person (the intrinsic test).90 The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
district court properly applied analytic dissection to five groups of 
features of the programs, not to identify infringement or compare 
similarities, but “for the purpose of defining the scope of plaintiff’s 
copyright.”91 The court agreed with this approach and stated that 
copyrightability applies to both the ownership element as well as the 
copying element of the claim.92 One aspect of copyright ownership “is 
the copyrightability of the subject matter.”93 
Circuits that apply the doctrines as bars to copyrightability base 
their approach primarily on § 102(b) policy grounds. As discussed, 
application of the doctrines in this manner serves additional goals, such 
                                                                                                             
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 1545. 
 86 Id. at 1546 (noting that fair use acts as a defense only after a work meets the 
standard for copyright protection). 
 87 Id. at 1547. 
 88 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 89 Id. at 1475. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 1475-76. 
 92 Id. at 1475. 
 93 Id. at 1476. 
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as promoting competition.94 The next section explains the application of 
the doctrines as a defense to infringement and demonstrates several 
shortcomings to this approach. 
B. The Doctrines Applied as Defenses to Infringement 
A second approach applies the doctrines solely to the defense prong 
of the infringement claim and removes the doctrines’ application as bars 
to copyrightability. This section explains the reasoning of courts that 
follow this approach. In addition, this section discusses the view of a 
well-recognized authority on copyright law. Finally, this section 
introduces important considerations, which are not discussed by Nimmer 
or the courts. 
In Kregos v. Associated Press, the Second Circuit considered 
whether a baseball pitching form was copyrightable.95 The court noted 
                                                                                                             
 94 It is also worth considering the copyright registration process. As previously 
discussed, the first prong of a copyright infringement claim is ownership of a valid 
copyright. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).  To satisfy this 
prong, the plaintiff must prove that the work is original, which requires a showing of 
proper adherence to statutory formalities.  Id. at 361. The statutory formalities, under 17 
U.S.C. § 411, demand that the copyright has been preregistered or registered. 17 U.S.C. § 
411(a) (2006) (“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work 
shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been 
made in accordance with this title.”).  Unlike trademark registration or patent filing where 
the application process is rigorous and heavily screened by the Patent and Trademark 
Office, copyright registration is lax and registrations are issued with relatively low 
scrutiny by the Copyright Office. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 594 F. Supp. 
364, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Therefore, the existence of a certificate of copyright 
registration is simply prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the 
defendant may rebut that presumption.  Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 
1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Brown Bag Software v. Symantec, 960 F.2d 1465, 
1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the plaintiff’s copyright registration created a 
presumption of validity that the defendant was entitled to rebut). 
  The merger and scènes à faire doctrines state that the expression of an idea may be 
unoriginal due to the limited means of expressing the underlying idea. No reason supports 
reserving the application of these doctrines to the substantial similarity side of the 
analysis when they may be determinative from the outset. Not applying the doctrines at 
this step would take away a defendant’s ability to rebut the presumption of validity. This 
argument was offered in Kregos, in which Judge Sweet, in a dissenting opinion, 
contended that the proper approach for the merger analysis requires the courts to decide 
whether the copyrighted work meets the requirement of creativity and whether merger 
exists before allowing copyright protection. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 
715 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., dissenting). Judge Sweet interpreted the language of § 102 
of the Copyright Act to indicate that copyright protection simply cannot be attributed to a 
work, where the expression is inseparable from the underlying idea: “‘[i]n no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea  . . . regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.’”  
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)). 
 95 937 F.2d 700, 701 (2d Cir. 1991). The plaintiff distributed his pitching form to 
newspapers, which displayed information about the past performances of opposing 
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that assessing merger in the alleged infringement context rather than the 
copyrightability context provides “a more detailed and realistic basis” 
upon which a claim should be evaluated.96 The court offered no further 
guidance than this statement of the circuit’s prior precedent under 
Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp.97 However, as Judge Sweet noted 
in his dissent, the majority relied on precedent that did not reach the 
question of merger at all.98 Judge Sweet argued that a proper merger 
analysis requires the court to decide whether the copyrighted work meets 
the requirement of creativity and whether merger exists before allowing 
copyright protection.99 
Nevertheless, in Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., the 
Second Circuit solidified its position that the merger doctrine serves as a 
defense to infringement.100 On appeal, the Second Circuit examined 
whether the lower court applied the doctrine of merger prematurely as 
part of the copyrightability inquiry.101 The court determined that the 
lower court applied the doctrine prematurely on the grounds that 
descriptions of the defendant’s work were not available; therefore, no 
basis for evaluating the idea-expression divide existed.102 In general, the 
court reasoned that only when all contested forms of expression are 
                                                                                                             
pitchers scheduled to start the baseball game each day. Id. at 702. The form contained 
several categories of data arranged in a particular format. Id. at 702-03. Some, but not all, 
of the categories of data had been utilized in other publications in the past. Id. The 
plaintiff successfully registered his pitching form with the Copyright Office. Id. at 702. 
The Associated Press began publishing a nearly identical form a year after the plaintiff’s 
first distribution. Id. The district court concluded, in part, that the limited space available 
in the newspaper for displaying pitching forms so limited the possible variations of the 
statistics that the idea of the form had merged with its expression and, thus, the plaintiff’s 
form did not warrant copyright protection. Id. at 703. On appeal, the court reversed and 
remanded the ruling of the district court. Id. at 711. 
 96 Id. at 705 (citing Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 916 (2d Cir. 
1980)). 
 97 630 F.2d 905, 916 (2d Cir. 1980). In Durham, the court found that the two 
expressions in question were dissimilar; therefore, merger was not at issue. Id. at 918. 
 98 Kregos, 937 F.2d at 715. (Sweet, J., dissenting). Judge Sweet argued that a proper 
merger analysis requires the court to decide whether the copyrighted work meets the 
requirement of creativity and whether merger exists before allowing copyright protection. 
Id.  Again, as most circuits applying the doctrine as a bar to copyrightability did, Judge 
Sweet interpreted § 102(b) as indicating that copyright protection cannot extend to a 
work that is inseparable from the underlying idea. Id. Judge Sweet also noted that the 
majority of cases have followed the copyright bar approach. Id. 
 99 Id. at 715. 
 100 86 F.3d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1996). In that case, the plaintiff and the defendant were 
creators of mannequins that serve as mounts for animal skins. Id. at 321. The defendant 
frequently used mannequins created by other manufacturers including those of the 
plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff, therefore, sued the defendant for copyright infringement for 
selling duplicates of the plaintiff’s model. Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 322. 
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presented can the court apply merger at the copyrightability stage.103 
Those cases are all but unlikely.104 Therefore, the court reasoned that the 
better approach would be to evaluate the doctrine in the context of 
particular infringement in consideration of evidence relating to 
substantial similarity so as to have a “‘more detailed and realistic basis’” 
for evaluation.105 Certainly, where descriptions of a defendant’s work are 
not present, the idea-expression dichotomy is immeasurable. However, 
so too would be any substantial similarity analysis. Under such a 
rationale, neither prong of the copyright infringement test could be 
evaluated. 
In Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., the Seventh Circuit 
stressed the importance of maintaining the difference between copyright 
invalidity and scènes à faire.106 Comparing Shakespeare’s Romeo and 
Juliet against Bernstein’s West Side Story and Bellini’s I Capuletti e i 
Montecchi, the court explained that the core scenes of Romeo and Juliet, 
being in the public domain, could be incorporated into Bernstein’s own 
work; however, this act did not equate to placing West Side Story in the 
public domain.107 Bernstein could, in fact, obtain a copyright for his own 
contributions to the work, which would disallow another from copying 
his work but not from using similar scenes.108 Although it appears that 
this case completely separates scènes à faire from the issue of 
copyrightability, the court recognizes that, where a work is entirely 
composed of scènes à faire, albeit a rare instance, the work would not 
warrant copyright protection.109 Therefore, scènes à faire can be 
determinative of copyrightability. 
                                                                                                             
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. (quoting Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir.1991)). 
 106 77 F.3d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1996). In this case, the plaintiff manufactured the 
number-one selling car wax, NU FINISH, on the market until the defendant introduced a 
competing product, FINISH 2001, which ultimately surpassed plaintiff’s market share. 
Id. at 911. The plaintiff sued the defendant for copyright infringement claiming that the 
defendant’s “Revolutionary” and “Mission” commercials touting its product were 
knockoffs of a similar commercial by a third-party distributing company and that the 
main elements of the commercial–“laboratory test results, the revival of a weather-beaten 
car, the imperviousness of the polish to many car washes”–were scènes à faire, which did 
not fall under the scope of copyright protection. Id. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant on all claims. Id. The district court gave two reasons 
for allowing the defendant to use its two commercials: first, it simply used hackneyed 
ideas–“polishing up old cars, washing the polished cars, claiming the support of lab 
tests”–and that copyright law does not allow a claim of ownership on rudimentary ideas 
or common situations under the scènes à faire doctrine and, second, plaintiff’s own 
“Junkyard” commercial was not copyrightable. Id. at 913-14. 
 107 Id. at 914. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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Circuits maintaining that the doctrines have no place in determining 
copyrightability overlook the fact that the application of the doctrines on 
the infringement prong nonetheless considers the copyrightability of a 
work.  In Lexmark, the majority criticized the district court by stating: 
[i]n refusing to consider whether “external factors such as 
compatibility requirements, industry standards, and efficiency” 
circumscribed the number of forms that [the computer program at 
issue] could take, the district court believed that the idea-
expression divide and accompanying principles of merger and 
[scènes à faire] play a role only in the “substantial similarity” 
analysis and do not apply when the first prong of the 
infringement test (copyrightability) is primarily at issue.110 
The majority in Lexmark determined that “[b]oth prongs of the 
infringement test . . . consider ‘copyrightability,’ which, at its heart, turns 
on the principle that copyright protection extends to expression, not to 
ideas.”111 On the substantial similarity prong, the doctrines do not 
measure similarity, but rather serve to distinguish the protectable 
elements of a work from the unprotectable elements.112 
Professor Nimmer, a well-renowned authority on copyright law,113 
recognizes the split regarding the doctrines.114 Nimmer states that “[i]t is 
not always clear whether the merger doctrine is deemed a bar to 
copyright protection itself, rather than simply as a defense to 
infringement via substantial similarity.”115 With regard to merger, 
Nimmer takes the stance that the better approach is to evaluate the idea-
expression dichotomy in terms of a particular dispute rather than baring 
                                                                                                             
 110 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537-38 (6th 
Cir. 2004). 
 111 Id. at 538. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Professor Nimmer has authored multiple books and treatises spanning more than 
three decades and is widely considered by many to be a leading authority on copyright 
law. E.g., 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1. This fact is supported by the copious 
federal court opinions citing to his treatises as well as common recognition by 
practitioners. See e.g., Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 
2001); see also Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
581, 589-92 (2004). 
 114 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1. Nimmer discusses the split within the section 
titled “Negating Substantial Similarity,” which notes the doctrines supporting a 
defendant’s challenge to a substantial similarity claim. Id. § 13.03[B] (“Having set forth 
above the tests for determining substantial similarity, the question remains how the 
defendant may challenge such a legal conclusion. Most obviously, the defendant may 
deny that such similarity exists. Alternatively, the defendant may concede that some 
matters are similar, but maintain that they concern unprotected elements, or are otherwise 
nonactionable.”). 
 115 Id. § 13.03[B][3]. 
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certain expressions from copyright protection per se.116 Nimmer 
proposed that, under this paradigm, similarity of expression resulting 
from the fact that a common idea is capable only of expression in a 
stereotyped form will make findings of actionable similarity 
impossible.117 Nimmer clarified that this stance does not suggest “‘that, 
because original copyrighted features are, or may be described as, 
standard or commonplace, they may be freely copied.’”118 Rather, 
Nimmer concluded that “permissible copying is limited to ‘that similarity 
which necessarily results from the replication of an idea.’”119 
As the majority in Lexmark points out, Nimmer does not 
wholeheartedly disagree with utilizing merger as determinative of 
copyright.120 The opinion states that 
[a]s a matter of practice, Nimmer is correct that courts most 
commonly discuss the idea-expression dichotomy in considering 
whether an original work and a partial copy of that work are 
“substantially similar” (as part of prong two of the infringement 
test), since the copyrightability of a work as a whole (prong one) 
is less frequently contested.121 
In fact, in his treatise, Nimmer states only that the better view is the 
treatment of the doctrine as a defense.122 
Nimmer has also been challenged by the courts. Judge Sweet, in his 
dissenting opinion in Kregos v. Associated Press, interpreted Nimmer as 
requiring a court to hold that, where merger exists, the two disputed 
works are not substantially similar even when they are identical.123 Judge 
Sweet called this requirement “a not useful variety of doublespeak.”124 
Looking to other circuit and district court decisions, the dissent noted 
                                                                                                             
 116 Id. (“It is not always clear whether the merger doctrine is deemed a bar to 
copyright protection itself, rather than simply a defense to the charge of infringement via 
substantial similarity. . . . [T]he better view construes it as the latter, evaluating the 
inseparability of idea and expression in the context of a particular dispute, rather than 
attempting to disqualify certain expressions from protection per se.”). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133, 136 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 2004)). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 538 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
 121 Id. at 538. It is noteworthy that Nimmer’s discussion of the doctrines and the 
circuit split falls within the section titled “Negating Substantial Similarity,” which 
discusses the resources available to a defendant in which they may challenge a substantial 
similarity claim. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[B]. 
 122 Id. § 13.03[B][3][b]. 
 123 Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 715 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., 
dissenting). 
 124 Id. 
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that, at the time, a majority of cases followed the method where merger 
becomes an issue when the copyrighted work and the alleged infringing 
work appear to be similar on the surface.125  The dissent argued that the 
Nimmer approach leads to the “erroneous conclusion” that the doctrine is 
available only where the alleged infringer has independently created a 
work, which coincidentally happens to be similar to the work of the 
plaintiff. Judge Sweet reasoned that this approach would imply that 
merger is only utilized as a tool to explain the unintentional similarity.126 
Therefore, the dissent continued, a defendant who has actually copied a 
work is not allowed to rely on the merger doctrine to avoid liability.127 
The dissent concluded that this approach finds support not from the 
strictures of § 102(b), but from the fundamental principles of copyright 
law; an independent creation is never deemed infringement.128 
In the previously mentioned cases, the courts show indifference to 
transaction and litigation costs. Considering the small players that are 
involved in many copyright infringement actions, lack of concern for this 
aspect demonstrates an unfairness to defendants who should not be 
subjected to long legal battles. This point was suggested in Hart, when 
the court stated that “in essence, the merger inquiry asks whether all 
[works], no matter how artistic they might be, will necessarily be 
‘substantially similar.’ And only if this is so, is there no unique 
                                                                                                             
 125 Id. at 715-16 (citing Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 
1458, 1463 (5th Cir. 1990); Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th 
Cir.1986); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 
1971); Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer Law Book Publishers, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 107, 
109 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that work which does not “exceed[ ] the boundaries of 
‘idea’ and enter[ ] the realm of ‘expression’” is not protectible); Freedman v. Grolier 
Enters., Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“When an idea is so restrictive that 
it necessarily requires a particular form of expression, that is, when the idea and its 
expression are functionally inseparable, to permit the copyrighting of the expression 
would be to grant the copyright owner a monopoly of the idea.”). 
 126 Id. at 716. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. The dissent argued that, under the approach that utilizes merger as 
determinative of copyrightability, an alleged infringer who has directly copied a work is 
absolved if the idea of the plaintiff’s work has merged into the expression. Id. (citing 
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742) (“When the ‘idea’ and its ‘expression’ are 
thus inseparable, copying the ‘expression’ will not be barred, since protecting the 
‘expression’ in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the ‘idea.’”) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted)).  Judge Sweet reasoned that this approach more fully accords 
with the language and purpose of § 102(b); it focuses consideration on the definition of 
the idea of the work at the outset of an infringement inquiry. Id.  Although the dissent 
agreed that assessing merger in the context of the alleged infringement would lead to a 
more realistic and detailed basis for evaluating a merger claim, Judge Sweet supported 
the application of the merger doctrine to the issue of copyrightability rather than the 
alleged infringement. Id. 
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expression to protect under the copyright laws.”129 This suggestion 
implies, not only that merger should be applied as determinative of 
copyrightability, but also that the case could be disposed of on motion to 
dismiss grounds. This would be the most equitable approach for the court 
to take because it would allow the courts, when possible, to dismiss the 
case early on, fostering judicial economy and saving litigation costs. As 
will be discussed in Part IV.B, the threat of litigation alone has been 
abused by copyright owners, which has dampened the constitutional goal 
of the creative progress. Thus, courts should consider the doctrines from 
the outset. 
Application of the doctrines as defenses to copyrightability do not 
consider the provisions set out in § 102(b). In addition, litigation and 
transaction costs are not considered under this approach. It is also 
important to note that the cases analyzed in this section are quite 
different from DMCA liability cases. As will be discussed in the next 
section, the DMCA creates a possibility of liability for the circumvention 
of a technological protection measure regardless of whether the actual 
use of the copyrighted work infringes and despite claims of fair use or 
other exceptions generally recognized under copyright law.130 
Considering the harsh liability of the DMCA, courts should be more 
reluctant to find copyrightability. To fully understand this critical issue, a 
brief outline of the DMCA and its impact on copyright law is necessary. 
IV. ANALYZING THE SPLIT IN RESPONSE TO THE DMCA AND THE RISE 
IN FALSE POSITIVES 
This section provides a history of the events leading to the 
enactment of the groundbreaking Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”), which has caused significant controversy in the legal 
community due to the dramatic expansion of rights it has bestowed upon 
copyright owners, particularly, “the right to control access to copyrighted 
works.”131 The DMCA creates this right for owners, who utilize 
technology as a means of safeguarding their copyrighted works, by 
specifically proscribing the circumvention or the attempt of 
                                                                                                             
 129 Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 130 LEE A. HOLLAAR, LEGAL PROTECTION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION 135, 209 (BNA 
Books 2002); see Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1195 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (“Defendants who use such devices may be subject to liability under § 
1201(a)(1) whether they infringe or not.”). The DMCA explicitly carves out the exclusive 
list of safe harbor provisions that may be asserted as a defense to DMCA liability. 17 
U.S.C. § 1201 (d)–(j) (2006). 
 131 Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development 
of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 113, 118 
(2003). 
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circumvention of measures that are set in place to protect digital 
works.132 This section demonstrates that the central defense to DMCA 
liability is the absence of a copyrightable work. This section uses these 
considerations as the foundation for promoting application of the 
doctrines as bars to copyrightability to narrow the DMCA’s reach in light 
of the harsh proscriptions of the statute. 
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
1. Brief Historical Background of Copyright and the Birth of the 
“Paracopyright” 
In today’s world, the rights afforded to a copyright owner have 
been dramatically expanded and have become more complex. United 
States copyright law originally stemmed from the proposition that the 
free copying of an author’s “intangible products of the mind” would 
produce negative consequences.133 The Constitution expressly gives 
Congress the power to protect original works of authorship “to promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”134 However, the tone of copyright law has evolved 
through the centuries to, at first, provide greater protection to the author 
and for longer periods of time; later, to codify strict limitations on 
copyright protection such as fair use; and today, with the enactment of 
the DMCA, to create highly controversial “paracopyright” protections. 
In 1790, Congress enacted the first federal copyright act, which 
attempted to clarify and expand upon those open issues by granting 
ownership protection for two fourteen-year terms for the exploitation of 
“maps, charts and books.”135 In 1909, Congress completely revisited and 
revamped federal copyright laws.136 The Copyright Act of 1909 
expanded the subject matter of copyrightable works to all of the author’s 
                                                                                                             
 132 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); see United States v. 
Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“Due to the ease with which 
digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, 
copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the Internet 
without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy.”). 
 133 Abrahamson, supra note 9. 
 134 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 135 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, repealed by Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 
320, § 23, 35 Stat. 2075, 1080-81; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003); Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56-57 (1884); see JOYCE, supra note 14, 
at 20. 
 136 JOYCE, supra note 14, at 21 (noting that President Theodore Roosevelt called for “a 
complete revision of the copyright law to meet modern conditions” a full four years 
before the 1909 Act was finalized). 
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writings and allowed this ownership protection to last for two 28-year 
terms with the first term commencing at the time of publication.137 
Several legislative amendments were made to the 1909 Act to keep pace 
with evolving technologies.138 
Eventually, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 
Act” or “Copyright Act”), which dramatically altered the legal 
understanding of what subject matter qualifies for copyright protection 
and when it qualifies for copyright protection. The 1976 Act significantly 
expands the rights of copyright owners. The 1976 Act also widens the 
umbrella of copyrightable works to cover literary works; musical works; 
dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; graphic, 
pictorial, and sculptural works; motion pictures and audiovisual works; 
architectural works; and sound recordings.139 Equally important, the 
author no longer has to wait for the publication of his work to enjoy 
copyright protection; the 1976 Act allows for protection the moment a 
product of the mind becomes fixed in a tangible form.140 The length of 
ownership protection was also greatly expanded to endure the length of 
the author’s life term plus fifty years.141 Of premier importance, the 
exclusive rights for the owner of the copyright are explicitly carved out. 
These rights include the right to reproduce and adapt the work, the right 
to perform the work, the right to publicly display the work, and the right 
to distribute the work.142 
Prior to the digital age, the right to distribute was relatively 
unthreatened as copyright infringement from an economic harm 
standpoint was largely dependent on the cost of carrying out a particular 
infringement.143 In that era, a large number of infringing copies and an 
expansive distribution network was required to have a substantial effect 
                                                                                                             
 137 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81, repealed by Act of 
October 19, 1976, ch. 3, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-73; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194; see 
JOYCE, supra note 14, at 21. 
 138 See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140 § 1(b), 85 Stat. 391, 391 (adding 
sound recordings as copyrightable subject matter); Act of July 31, 1939, ch. 396, § 2, 53 
Stat. 1142, 1142 (adding commercial labels and prints as copyrightable subject matter); 
Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488, 488 (adding motion pictures as copyrightable 
subject matter). 
 139 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). This section of the Act still remains unchanged. 
 140 Id. It is important to note that a copyright infringement suit cannot be instituted 
unless the copyright has been preregistered or registered. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). 
 141 Act of October 19, 1976, ch. 3, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-73 (current version at 
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006)). The term of copyright has since been extended to the life of 
the author plus seventy years. Sony Bono Copyright Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 
§ 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998). 
 142 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 143 HOLLAAR, supra note 130, at 135. 
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on the market.144 Therefore, the exclusive right to distribute the work was 
relatively unchallenged. In the digital era, however, unlimited copies can 
be made, with little to no variation in quality from the original, and 
distributed all over the world at the touch of a button; the copyright 
holder may suffer millions of dollars in damages while the cost to the 
infringer literally disappears.145 Whereas before, “[a] few hand-made 
copies of a book would have little effect on the worldwide sale of a 
printed book,”146 today “an individual consumer may become a 
worldwide distributor of copyrighted material after obtaining a single, 
promotional copy in digital format.”147 
In the early 1980s, with copyright law inadequately protecting the 
behemoth entertainment industries from the realities of the digital age, 
technological measures were adopted, such as the invention of 
Macrovision by the motion picture industry, to thwart unauthorized 
copying of videocassettes containing copyright protected motion 
pictures.148 Satellite television joined the fray by encrypting its 
broadcasts to prevent unauthorized reception by viewers, who had not 
subscribed for its service.149 Congress responded to and aided the 
satellite television industry by enacting the Satellite Home Viewer Act.150 
The computer software industry also came on board with its own 
copyright protection measures, which were fiercely opposed by the 
public.151 Eventually, Congress enacted the Audio Home Recording Act 
of 1992 in response to the digital audio tape (“DAT”) recording format, a 
technological feat at the time, which allowed unauthorized persons to 
make “perfect” copies of recorded music.152 
Despite the efforts of Congress and the industries’ technological 
protections, copyright owners continued to fear that these measures were 
insufficient without a legal impediment designed to punish devices or 
services that circumvented the technological protections.153 This 
inescapable fact led the entertainment and computer industries to 
Congress’s doorstep again seeking modern-era protection of their 
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 145 Id. (citing United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536 (D. Mass. 1994)). 
 146 Id. 
 147 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 909 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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intellectual property interests. As a response to industry outcry and, in an 
attempt to gauge the effects the Internet would have on copyright 
infringement, a task force appointed by the Clinton Administration in 
1995 issued a “White Paper” analyzing whether existing intellectual 
property laws were sufficiently adapted to the new digital age.154 The 
White Paper issued proposals that would affect, among other things, 
dealings with the circumvention of technological protection on digital 
devices.155 Despite their valiant effort, the proposals set forth in the 
White Paper were ultimately rejected due to stiff resistance by Internet 
service providers as well as other outstanding problems that were left 
unaddressed.156 Meanwhile, the implementation of further methods of 
innovative electronic copyright protection continued.157 However, as the 
encryption methods increased, the availability of methods with which to 
bypass that protection also increased.158 The continued inadequacy of 
copyright law spurred Congress to act yet again. Their response was the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). 
The DMCA grants additional legal protection to copyright owners 
who utilize technology as a means to safeguard their works.159 The 
primary purpose of the statute reflects content owner demands by 
specifically proscribing the circumvention of measures that were set in 
place to protect digital works.160 The statute targets both devices that are 
primarily designed to circumvent these protection measures and devices 
that have only a limited commercially significant purpose other than the 
circumvention of these protection measures.161 So determined was 
Congress in its protection goals that only in the midst of bitter 
controversy between the industries and the public did they carve out a 
few, discreet exceptions to the general rule of blanket anti-circumvention 
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 157 Jeffrey A. Bloom et al., Copy Protection for DVD Video, 87 PROC. IEEE 1267, 
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Analog Protection System (“APS”) and the Copy Generation Management System 
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legislation: reverse engineering to achieve interoperability of software; 
the development of circumvention tools and circumvention for good faith 
encryption research; circumvention of access controls in the Internet 
context to enable filtering; circumvention of access controls to prevent 
the collection of personal on-line activity information; and the 
development of circumvention tools and circumvention for testing the 
security of computer systems.162 
These anti-circumvention proscriptions have created a new right 
under copyright law: “the right to control access to copyrighted 
works,”163 or “paracopyright.”164 This statute tipped the copyright power 
balance heavily in favor of the copyright owner and met with little 
enthusiasm in the legal world. Some legal theorists argued that the law 
should suppress technology by disallowing the creation and proliferation 
of anti-circumvention devices.165 Others objected to the increase in 
power bestowed upon the copyright owners by the grant of this access 
right and the shift in the balance between the copyright owner and rights 
of the user that ensued.166 
The proscriptions of the DMCA are severe and they have drawn 
much criticism, particularly due to the gross misuse of copyright 
protection that the statute allows. Not only is the circumvention of 
technology protection measures considered illegal under the DMCA, but 
trafficking in circumventing technology is also proscribed, even to the 
extent that the public release of information regarding ways to 
                                                                                                             
 162 Id. § 1201(d)-(g). 
 163 Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 118. 
 164 The court in United States v. Elcom stated that 
as reflected in the legislative history of the DMCA, Congress recognized 
that while the purpose of the DMCA was to protect intellectual property 
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203 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (citations omitted). 
 165 Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 118. 
 166 Id. at 118-19. 
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circumvent protection mechanisms is considered trafficking.167 The 
severity of the legislation also becomes apparent when one considers that 
attempting to circumvent a protected device, whether successful or not, 
triggers DMCA liability. Although it would be hard to dispute that access 
controls are not important in the digital age, there is much cause for 
concern in terms of the protection the DMCA affords the copyright 
owner. The provisions of § 1201(a), which protect technological access 
control of “a work protected under this title,” do not state “how much of 
the work” must be protected.168 Accordingly, it is possible that the 
circumvention of a completely public work that is cloaked in a 
technological protection measure may trigger DMCA liability so long as 
the public work is infused with some copyrightable elements.169 As Jane 
Ginsburg eloquently stated, as a practical consequence “[a] copyrightable 
figleaf that a producer affixes to an otherwise unprotectable work could, 
as a practical matter, obscure the public domain nakedness of the 
compiled information, and thereby insulate the [work] from the further 
access that is a prerequisite to otherwise lawful copying.”170 
Furthermore, protection under the DMCA potentially extends the 
life of a copyright far beyond the normal statutory period. For instance, 
consider the case of a movie in DVD format, which has been embedded 
with digital copy protection.171 The access protection will exist for the 
total life of the disc: potentially forever.172 Because the DMCA prohibits 
circumventing the copy protection to access the underlying work, it is 
possible that the work may be kept from the public domain indefinitely, 
thus, “making . . . entry into the public domain merely theoretical.”173 
Additionally, technological measures can never account for the 
intricacies of the law and, even if they could, no level of sophistication 
could enable them to adapt to the ever-changing law. As a consequence, 
the DMCA legalizes copyright misuse by creating unlimited term 
protection to works that are both protectable and not legitimately 
protectable under copyright.174 
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However, DMCA liability is not without its limitations. Modern 
interpretation of the statute dictates that the underlying work must 
contain some copyrightable subject matter.  In Chamberlain Group, Inc. 
v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.,175 Chamberlain, a manufacturer of a garage 
door opener (“GDO”) sued Skylink, a universal remote control 
manufacturer, in part, for violation of the DMCA.176 A central issue in 
this case was whether the access to the applications was authorized, 
which would exonerate the defendant of DMCA liability. More pertinent 
to this comment, however, was the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the 
DMCA in terms of its scope of liability. The court made several 
important points limiting the reach of the DMCA in anticircumvention 
suits. The court pronounced that some reasonable relationship must exist 
between the act of circumventing a technological access control and the 
copyrighted work.177 The court also noted that holding otherwise would 
allow a defendant to effectively create aftermarket monopolies.178 
Furthermore, the court felt that § 1201(c)(1), which states that “nothing 
in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to 
copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title,” would flatly 
contradict itself by proscribing unauthorized access without regard to 
other provisions of the Copyright Act.179 In consideration of these issues, 
the court held that the only meaningful interpretation of the DMCA was 
to require a nexus between the access and the protections otherwise 
                                                                                                             
 175 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Chamberlain’s GDO system utilized a copyrighted 
computer program called “rolling code” that acted as a security measure by changing the 
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 179 Id. at 1200 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006)). 
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afforded to copyright owners under the Copyright Act.180 Any other 
interpretation would grant “copyright owners carte blanche authority to 
preclude all use.”181 The court rested its decision on the fact that 
Chamberlain did not demonstrate a protected property right upon which 
Skylink infringed. Accordingly, should no copyright exist in the accessed 
work, no DMCA liability could ensue. 
2. Utilizing the Copyrightability Approach as a Response to the 
DMCA 
Under the DMCA, the work itself must be copyrightable in order to 
trigger DMCA liability. The single, unwavering escape from DMCA 
liability outside of the statutory safe harbor provisions is a finding that 
the underlying work does not warrant copyright protection. Thus, in 
consideration of the harsh effects of this controversial legislation, courts 
should apply the merger and scènes à faire doctrines as bars to 
copyrightability as opposed to defenses to infringement in DMCA cases. 
Under any other approach, the court would be forced to presume that 
DMCA liability has been triggered and undergo a liability analysis under 
that statute. This notion was considered in Lexmark International, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc.:182 the single case to date that involved 
DMCA concurrently with merger/scènes à faire issues. 
In that case, Lexmark, a printer manufacturer, sued Static Control 
Components (“SCC”), a printer remanufacturer, for copyright 
infringement in an effort to enjoin SCC from selling microchips that 
allowed competing printer cartridges to operate with Lexmark’s 
printers.183 Two programs at issue were the Toner Loading Program 
(“TLP”) and the Printer Engine Program (“PEP”); Lexmark owned 
copyrights for both the TLP and PEP programs and both programs could 
be read directly from the device on which they were stored.184 The TLP 
was responsible for measuring amounts of toner remaining in the 
cartridges.185 It was a very small program, less than 55 bytes depending 
on the printer model, consisting of only eight program commands which 
converted torque readings (using mathematical functions) to printer 
levels.186 The PEP controlled the functions of each printer, such as paper 
feeding and movement, and was larger than the TLP yet still relatively 
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small.187 Lexmark sold the cartridges on a prebate and non-prebate 
basis.188 The prebate cartridges were sold at an up-front discount under 
the agreement that the cartridge would be used only once and then would 
be returned to Lexmark.189 To ensure adherence to this agreement, a 
publicly available encryption algorithm was employed to calculate a 
Message Authentication Code (“MAC”) which operated as a handshake 
between the printer and the printer cartridge.190 The program compared 
the code calculated by the microchip against the code calculated by the 
printer; it terminated operation if the match was unsuccessful (only 
cartridges authorized by Lexmark would produce a match).191 After the 
authentication sequence was completed a second calculation was 
performed in which the PEP downloaded a copy of the TLP.192 A 
commonly used check-sum authentication sequence calculated the bytes 
of information in the code and compared it to a preset number which, if 
the numbers did not match, the Lexmark printer assumed the TLP was 
corrupted and would cease to operate.193 
SCC manufactured its “SMARTEK” microchips, which could 
break the Lexmark’s authentication sequence code.194 The chip could be 
installed on any competing printer cartridge in order to trick a Lexmark 
printer into thinking it was communicating with an authorized Lexmark 
printer cartridge.195 The chip contained an exact copy of the Lexmark 
TLP program.196 Lexmark brought suit against SCC for copyright 
infringement of the TLP as well as for circumvention of the TLP and 
PEP in violation of the DMCA.197 On the DMCA count, Lexmark 
contended that the SMARTEX chip circumvented the authentication 
sequence, which Lexmark claimed was a technological access control 
measure that protected the TLP.198 
The district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of 
Lexmark.199 The Sixth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and 
rejected the DMCA claims.200 According to the court, the two programs 
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were not protected by any control mechanism, since they were readily 
available in the printer memory.201 As such, the purchase of the printer 
automatically authorized access to the two programs and no DMCA 
violation could ensue.202 
Although the majority opinion did not mention the circuit split, 
Judge Feikens, in his dissenting opinion, raised the issue concerning 
whether the merger and scènes à faire doctrines act as an outright bar to 
copyrightability or if they only act as a defense to certain types of 
infringement.203 Taking each in turn, the dissent introduced his concern 
as to the relevancy of either approach.204 First, Judge Feikens stated that, 
if the doctrine was applied at the copyright stage and the court found that 
merger occurred, the plaintiff would lose his opportunity to assert any 
claim for relief under the DMCA, which applies only to works that are 
protected under copyright law.205 On the other hand, the dissent noted 
that, if the doctrine was applied at the infringement stage, the court must 
consider a DMCA analysis despite having found that merger occurred.206 
Accordingly, the dissent felt that it was essential to determine which 
approach to take before entering the DMCA analysis.207 
As a general rule, in cases involving merger with a method of 
operation, Judge Feikens suggested that the doctrine apply at the 
infringement stage of the analysis and “ha[ve] no bearing on the question 
of copyrightability” of the work.208 Judge Feikens explained that the 
Copyright Act precludes copyright protection of methods of operation.209 
However, the dissent noted that a text that is otherwise copyrightable 
“can be used as a method of operation of a computer” using the example 
of a poem used as a password or, in this case, a computer program used 
as a lock-out code.210 Judge Feikens reasoned that it was important to 
know how the alleged infringer used the material in order to determine 
whether merger occurred.211 
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Judge Feikens’s explanation of why the merger doctrine should be 
addressed in the infringement prong did not extend only to the merger of 
an expression with a method of operation; it applied to all cases.212 The 
dissent stressed that the use of the work should be viewed separately 
from the issue of copyrightability. However, the dissent’s very thorough 
explanation failed to answer why merger could not be considered with 
the question of copyrightability. In fact, Judge Feikens notably pointed 
out that the application of the doctrine to copyrightability could be 
determinative in subjecting a defendant to DMCA liability. Additionally, 
with regard to scènes à faire, Judge Feikens stated that, where possible, 
scènes à faire should come into play in determining the question of 
copyrightability.213 Moreover, the DMCA creates a possibility of liability 
for the circumvention of a technological protection measure regardless 
of whether the actual use of the copyrighted work infringes, and in spite 
of fair use or other exceptions generally recognized under copyright 
law.214 The anticircumvention proscriptions are independent of the 
copyright claim. It must logically follow that application of the merger 
and scènes à faire doctrines as defenses are similarly unhelpful in 
escaping the harsh DMCA liability based on the simple fact that the 
statute has already been triggered. Therefore, limiting application of the 
doctrines solely to the infringement defense prong deprives the defendant 
of a valid safe harbor from DMCA liability, because she was unable to 
argue the existence of an invalid copyright under the bar to 
copyrightability approach. To ensure the loss of this defense, Congress 
did not pass a proposed amendment to revise the DMCA, which would 
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impose liability only when the access-control circumvention led to actual 
copyright infringement.215 This legislative action further emphasizes the 
notion that applying the doctrines in the context of copyright 
infringement defense is not helpful. Should the day come when this 
amendment is passed, reconsideration of this split in DMCA cases may 
be appropriate. That day is not today. 
B. The Issue of False Positives 
The rising cost of false positives also supports the application of the 
doctrines as bars to copyrightability. In the copyright context, a false 
positive occurs when copyright protection is improperly attributed to a 
work that does not warrant protection.216 False positives directly affect 
error costs: the costs attributed to erroneous outcomes in intellectual 
property cases.217 The error costs depend on the frequency of generating 
a false positive and the social cost created by the false positive.218 An 
increase in either or both of these two factors leads to an increase in the 
error cost. The issue of false positives directly affects the balance 
between copyright ownership rights and creative expression: too much 
copyright protection may create a dampening effect on later creative 
efforts by bestowing a windfall upon the plaintiff in an infringement 
suit.219 
A legal rule may have the effect of increasing or decreasing the 
frequency of a false positive220 and an error can occur when the law is 
applied to the facts of a case incorrectly.221 Disallowing application of 
merger at the copyrightability stage would lead to an increase in the 
frequency of false positives. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act 
specifically forbids a grant of copyright protection to an idea.222 The 
merger doctrine is rooted in this ideal by demanding that, where an idea 
is capable of expression in only few ways, the expression and the idea 
merge; thus, no copyright protection may be granted as dictated by § 
102(b). Similarly, scènes à faire follows the same ideal by stating that 
stock scenes do not qualify as expression but are closer to the idea. Thus, 
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keeping this doctrine outside of the question of copyrightability allows 
works, where the expression and the idea merge, to incorrectly obtain 
copyright protection, which increases the frequency of false positives and 
error costs. 
Generally, a false positive in the copyright context creates a social 
cost by keeping a creative work out of the public domain. This cost is 
balanced by the goal of copyright law to create incentives for artists to 
contribute creative works to the world. During the term of copyright, the 
copyright owner may benefit from his bundle of rights by disallowing 
copies or derivative works absent payment of licensing fees or some 
other contractual arrangement. However, the constitutional intent is to 
grant this privilege for only a limited time. This balance shifts to unfairly 
benefit the copyright owner in DMCA-era paracopyright law. The false 
grant of a copyright places the work under DMCA jurisdiction when the 
work is guarded by a technological protection measure to prevent access. 
Once this measure has been taken, a work may indefinitely be kept out of 
the public domain, lest a person be willing to circumvent the protection 
measure and face DMCA liability. This potential reality stands in stark 
contrast to the “securing [copyright] for limited [t]ime[]” constitutional 
language.223 While this shift may be favorable to the copyright owner 
who may reap the benefit of this monopoly, society suffers by incurring 
costs to access the work or to create derivatives thereof. 
Falsely granting an unwarranted copyright allows the owner to get 
away with legal murder by reaping the benefits of the monopoly while 
unfairly creating the social costs of barring access to the work.224 The 
copyright owner is free to charge others with DMCA liability as well as 
copyright infringement, which results in unnecessary litigation costs for 
defendants as well as undue burdens for the courts. Administrative 
efficiency suffers due to a backlog of copyright infringement and DMCA 
cases on a court docket that should not be there in the first place. By not 
applying merger and scènes à faire at the copyrightability stage, there is 
even more danger in wrongfully protecting the “expression” by way of a 
false positive. Whereas a false positive grants protection where it should 
not be allowed, in this case, a false positive would improperly grant 
protection to the idea or the stock scene, because that safeguard is 
removed when the doctrines are not considered at the copyrightability 
stage. Therefore, the allowance of a false positive stands in stark contrast 
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with § 102(b) proscription of granting copyright protection to an idea. 
Where ideas become legally protected, the intent of promoting the 
progress of the useful arts is lost. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Applying the merger and scènes à faire doctrines as bars to 
copyrightability will support both the § 102(b) idea-expression 
dichotomy, which declares that ideas are not copyrightable subject matter 
due to the harmful monopoly effects it would otherwise create as well as 
the constitutional goal of fostering creative expression by rendering ideas 
free to the world. Since the enactment of the DMCA, the flaws of the 
statute have continued to reveal themselves. Paracopyright protection 
forms a dark cloud over copyright law with terrible repercussions to 
society despite the benefits to the copyright owners. By applying the 
merger and scènes à faire doctrines to the issue of copyrightability, 
defendants are deprived of a valid escape mechanism from harsh DMCA 
liability. Finally, the danger of false positives in the copyright context 
sends a harbinger for the courts to consider the doctrines as a bar to 
copyrightability rather than as a defense to particular types of 
infringement. 
